Now that machine learning algorithms lie at the center of many important resource allocation pipelines, computer scientists have been unwittingly cast as partial social planners. Given this state of aairs, important questions follow. How do leading notions of fairness as dened by computer scientists map onto longer-standing notions of social welfare? In this paper, we present a welfare-based analysis of fair classication regimes. Our main ndings assess the welfare impact of fairness-constrained empirical risk minimization programs on the individuals and groups who are subject to their outputs. We fully characterize the ranges of perturbations to a fairness parameter in a fair Soft Margin SVM problem that yield better, worse, and neutral outcomes in utility for individuals and by extension, groups. Our method of analysis allows for fast and ecient computation of "fairness-to-welfare" solution paths, thereby allowing practitioners to easily assess whether and which fair learning procedures result in classication outcomes that make groups better-o. Our analyses show that applying stricter fairness criteria codied as parity constraints can worsen welfare outcomes for both groups. More generally, always preferring "more fair" classiers does not abide by the Pareto Principle-a fundamental axiom of social choice theory and welfare economics. Recent work in machine learning has rallied around these notions of fairness as critical to ensuring that algorithmic systems do not have disparate negative impact on disadvantaged social groups. By showing that these constraints often fail to translate into improved outcomes for these groups, we cast doubt on their eectiveness as a means to ensure fairness and justice.
INTRODUCTION
In his 1979 Tanner Lectures, Amartya Sen noted that since nearly all egalitarian theories are founded on an equality of some sort, the heart of the issue rests on clarifying the "equality of what?" problem [1] . The eld of fair machine learning has not escaped this essential question. Does machine learning have an obligation Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for prot or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specic permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. to assure probabilistic equality of outcomes across various social groups [2, 3] ? Or does it simply owe an equality of treatment [4] ? Does fairness demand that individuals (or groups) be subject to equal mistreatment rates [5, 6] ? Or does being fair refer only to avoiding some intolerable level of algorithmic error?
Currently, the task of accounting for fair machine learning cashes out in the comparison of myriad metrics-probability distributions, error likelihoods, classication rates-sliced up every way possible to reveal the range of inequalities that may arise before, during, and after the learning process. But as shown in work by Chouldechova [7] and Kleinberg et al. [8] , fundamental statistical incompatibilities rule out any solution that can satisfy all parity metrics. Fairnessconstrained loss minimization oers little guidance on its own for choosing among the fairness desiderata, which appear incommensurable and result in dierent impacts on dierent individuals and groups. We are thus left with the harsh but unavoidable task of adjudicating between these measures and methods. How ought we decide? For a given application, who actually benets from the operationalization of a certain fairness constraint? This is a basic but critical question that must be answered if we are to understand the impact that fairness constraints have on classication outcomes. Much research in fairness has been motivated by the well-documented negative impacts that these systems can have on already structurally disadvantaged groups. But do fairness constraints as currently formulated in fact earn their reputation as serving to improve the welfares of marginalized social groups?
When algorithms are adopted in social environments-consider, for example, the use of predictive systems in the nancial services industry-classication outcomes directly bear on individuals' material well-beings. We, thus, view predictions as resource allocations awarded to individuals and by extension, to various social groups. In this paper, we build out a method of analysis that takes in generic fair learning regimes and analyzes them from a welfare perspective.
Our main contributions, presented in Section 3, are methodological as well as substantive in the eld of algorithmic fairness. We show that how "fair" a classier is-how well it accords with a group parity constraint such as "equality of opportunity" or "balance for false positives"-does not neatly translate into statements about dierent groups' welfares are aected. Drawing on techniques from parametric programming and nding a SVM's regularization path, our method of analysis nds the optimal -fair Soft-Margin SVM solution for all values of a fairness tolerance parameter 2 [0, 1]. We track the welfares of individuals and groups as a function of and identify those ranges of values that support solutions that are Pareto-dominated by neighboring values. Further, the algorithmic implementation of our analyses is computationally ecient, with a complexity on the same order as current standard SVM solvers that t a single SVM model, and is thus practical as a procedure that translates fairness constraints into welfare eects for all .
Our substantive results show that a classier that abides by a stricter fairness standard does not necessarily issue improved outcomes for the disadvantaged group. In particular, we prove two results: rst, starting at any nonzero -fair optimal SVM solution, we express the range of < 0 perturbations that tighten the fairness constraint and lead to classier-output allocations that are weakly Pareto dominated by those issued by the "less fair" original classier. Second, there are nonzero -fair optimal SVM solutions, such that there exist < 0 perturbations that yield classications that are strongly Pareto dominated by those issued by the "less fair" original classier. We demonstrate these ndings on the Adult dataset. In general, our results show that when notions of fairness rest entirely on leading parity-based notions, always preferring more fair machine learning classiers does not accord with the Pareto Principle, an axiom typically seen as fundamental in social choice theory and welfare economics.
The purposes of our paper are twofold. The rst is simply to encourage a welfare-centric understanding of algorithmic fairness. Whenever machine learning is deployed within important social and economic processes, concerns for fairness arise when societal ideals are in tension with a decision-maker's interests. Most leading methodologies have focused on optimization of utility or welfare to the vendor but have rarely awarded those individuals and groups who are subject to these systems the same kind of attention to welfare eects. Our work explicitly focuses its analysis on the latter.
We also seek to highlight the limits of conceptualizing fairness only in terms of group-based parity measures. Our results show that at current, making a system "more fair" as dened by popular metrics can harm the vulnerable social populations that were ostensibly meant to be served by the imposition of such constraints. Though the Pareto Principle is not without faults, the frequency with which "more fair" classication outcomes are welfare-wise dominated by "less fair" ones occurs is troublesome and should lead scholars to reevaluate popular methodologies by which we understand the impact of machine learning on dierent social populations.
Related Work
Research in fair machine learning has largely centered on computationally dening "fairness" as a property of a classier and then showing that techniques can be invented to satisfy such a notion [2-5, 5, 6, 9-18] . Since most methods are meant to apply to learning problems generally, many such notions of fairness center on parity-based metrics about a classier's behavior on various legally protected social groups rather than on matters of welfare.
Most of the works that do look toward a welfare-based framework for interpreting appeals to fairness sit at the intersection of computing and economics. Mullainathan [19] also makes a comparison between policies as set by machine learning systems and policies as set by a social planner. He argues that systems that make explicit their description of a global welfare function are less likely to perpetrate biased outcomes and are more successful at ameliorating social inequities. Heidari et al. [20] propose using social welfare functions as fairness constraints on loss minimization programs. They suggest that a learner ought to optimize her classier while in Rawls' original position. As a result, their approach to social welfare is closely tied with considerations of risk. Rather than integrate social welfare functions into the supervised learning pipeline, we claim that the result of an algorithmic classication system can itself be considered a welfare-impacting allocation. Thus, our work simply takes a generic -fair learning problem as-is, and then considers the welfare implications of its full path of outcomes for all 2 [0, 1] on individuals as well as groups. Attention to the potential harms of machine learning systems is not new, of course. Within the fairness literature, Corbett-Davies & Goel [21] and Liu et al. [22] devote most of their analyses to the person-impacting eects of algorithmic systems. We agree that these eects are relevant to the question of fairness, but our results dier in their methodological focus: we introduce a technique that derives the full range of welfare eects achieved by a fair classication algorithm.
The techniques that we use to translate fair learning outcomes into welfare paths are related to a number of existing works. The proxy fairness constraint in our instantiation of the -fair SVM problem original appeared in Zafar et al. 's work on restricting the disparate impact of machine classiers [5] . Their research introduces this particular proxy fairness constrained program and shows that it can be eciently solved and well approximates target fairness constraints. We use the constraint to demonstrate our overall ndings about the eect of fairness criteria on individual and group welfares. We share some of the preliminary formulations of the fair SVM problem with Donini et al. [17] though they focus on the statistical and fairness guarantees of the generalized ERM program. Lastly, though work on tuning hyperparameters of SVMs and the solution paths that result seem far aeld from questions of fairness and welfare, our analysis on the eect of fairness perturbations on welfare take advantage of methods in that line of work [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] .
PROBLEM FORMALIZATION
Our framework and results are motivated by those algorithmic use cases in which considerations of fairness and welfare stand alongside those of eciency. Because our paper connects machine classication and notions of algorithmic fairness with conceptions of social welfare, we rst provide an overview of the notation and assumptions that feature throughout our work.
In the empirical loss minimization problem, a learner seeks a classier h that issues the most accurate predictions when trained on set of n data points {x i , z i , i } n i=1 . Each triple gives an individual's feature vector x i 2 X, protected class attribute z i 2 {0, 1}, and true label i 2 { 1, +1}. 1 A classier that assigns an incorrect label h(x i ) , i incurs a penalty.
The empirical risk minimizing predictor is given by
where hypothesis h : X ! R gives a learner's model, the loss function`: R⇥{ 1, +1} ! R gives the penalty incurred by a prediction, and H is the hypothesis class under the learner's consideration. Binary classication systems issue predictions h(x) 2 { 1, +1}. Notions of fairness have been formalized in a variety of ways in the machine learning literature. Though Dwork et al.'s [4] initial conceptualization remains prominent and inuential, much work has since dened fairness as a parity notion applied across dierent protected class groups [3, 5, 7, 8, 17, 18] . The following denition gives the general form of these types of fairness criteria. Denition 2.1. A classier h satises a general group-based notion of -fairness if
where is some function of classier h performance, and E z i =0 and E z i =1 are events that occur with respect to groups z = 0 and z = 1 respectively.
Further specications of the function and the events E instantiate particular group-based fairness notions. For example, when (`, h, x i , i ) = h(x i ) and E z i refers to the events in which i = +1 for each group z i 2 {0, 1}, Denition 2.1 gives an -approximation of equality of opportunity [3] . When (`, h, x i , i ) =`(h(x i ), i ) and E z i refers to all classication events for each group z i , Denition 2.1 gives the notion of -approximation of overall error rate balance [7] . Notice that as increases, the constraint loosens, and the solution is considered "less fair. " As decreases, the fairness constraint becomes more strict, and the solution is considered "more fair. "
Mapping classication outcomes to changes in individuals' welfares gives a useful method of analysis for many data-based algorithmic systems that are involved in resource distribution pipelines. In particular, we consider tools that issue outcomes uniformly ranked, or preferred, by those individuals who are the subjects of the system. That is, individuals agree on which outcome is preferred. Examples of such systems abound: applicants for credit generally want to be found eligible; candidates for jobs generally want to be hired, or at least ranked highly in their pool. These realms are precisely those in which fairness considerations are urgent and where fairnessadjusted learning methods are most likely to be adopted.
WELFARE IMPACTS OF FAIRNESS CONSTRAINTS
The central inquiry of our work asks how fairness constraints as popularized in the algorithmic fairness community relate to welfarebased analyses that are dominant in economics and policy-making circles. Do fairness-adjusted optimization problems actually make marginalized groups better-o in terms of welfare? In this section, we work from an empirical risk minimization (ERM) program with generic fairness constraints parametrized by a tolerance parameter > 0 and trace individuals' and groups' welfares as a function of . We assume that an individual benets from receiving a positive classication, and thus we dene group welfare as
where n k give the number of individuals in group z = k. We note that W k can be dened in ways other than (2), which assumes that positive classication are always and only welfare-enhancing. Other work has considered the possibility that positive classications may in fact make individuals worse-o if they are false positives [22] . The denition of W k can be generalized to account for these cases. First, in Section 3.1, we present an instantiation of the -fair ERM problem with a fairness constraint proposed in prior work in algorithmic fairness. We work from the Soft-Margin SVM program and derive the various dual formulations that will be of use in the following analyses. In Section 3.2, we move on to show how perturbations to the fairness constraint in the -fair ERM problem yield changes in classication outcomes for individuals and by extension, how they impact a group's overall welfare. Our approach, which draws a connection between fairness perturbations and searches for an optimal SVM regularization parameter, tracks changes in an individual's classication by taking advantage of the codependence of variables in the dual of the SVM. By perturbing the fairness constraint, we observe changes in not its own corresponding dual variable but in the corresponding dual of the margin constraints, which relay the classication fates of data points.
Leveraging this technique, we plot the "solution paths" of the dual variable as a function of , which in turn allows us to compute group welfares as a function of and draw out substantive results on the dynamics of how classication outcomes change in response to -fair learning. We prove that stricter fairness standards do not necessarily support welfare-enhancing outcomes for the disadvantaged group. In many such cases, the learning goal of ensuring group-based fairness is incompatible with the Pareto Principle. In welfare economics, the Pareto Principle is a standard requirement of social welfare functionals-it would appear that the selection of an allocation that is Pareto dominated by an available alternative would be undesirable and even irresponsible! Nevertheless, we show that applying fairness criteria to loss minimization tasks in some cases do just that. We perform our analysis on the Soft-Margin SVM optimization problem and, for concreteness, work with a well-known fairness formulation in the literature. However, we note that our methods and results apply to fairness-constrained convex loss minimization programs more generally.
We also show that this method of analysis can form practical tools. In Section 3.3, we present a computationally ecient algorithmic implementation of our analyses, tting full welfare solution paths for all 2 [0, 1] values in a time complexity that is on the same order as that of a single SVM t. We close this section by working from the shadow price of the fairness constraint to derive local and global sensitivities of the optimal solution to perturbations.
Setting up the -fair ERM program
The general fairness-constrained empirical loss minimization program can be written as
where`(h(x), ) gives the empirical loss of a classier h 2 H on the dataset X. To maximize accuracy, the learner ought to minimize 0-1 loss; however because the loss function`0 1 is non-convex, a convex surrogate loss such as hinge loss (`h ) or log loss (`l og ) is frequently substituted in its place to ensure that globally optimal solutions may be eciently found. f h (x, )  gives a group-based fairness constraint of the type given in Denition 2.1, where > 0 is the unfairness "tolerance parameter"-a greater permits a greater group disparity on a metric of interest; a smaller more tightly restricts the level of permissible disparity. We examine the behavior of fairness-constrained linear SVM classiers, though we note that our techniques generalize to nonlinear kernels SVMs, since interpretations of the dual of the SVM and the full SVM regularization path are the same with kernels [24] . Our learner minimizes hinge loss with L 1 regularization; equivalently, she seeks a Soft-Margin SVM that is " -fair." Both SVM models and "fair training" approaches are in broad circulation. The fair empirical risk minimization program is thus given as
 where the learner seeks SVM parameters , b; i are non-negative slack variables that violate the margin constraint in the HardMargin SVM problem i ( | x i + b) 1 0, and C > 0 is a hyperparameter tunable by the learner to express the trade-o between preferring a larger margin and penalizing violations of the margin.
is the group parity-based fairness constraint.
The abundant literature on algorithmic fairness presents a long menu of options for the various forms that f ,b could take, but generally speaking, the constraints are non-convex. As such, much work has enlisted methods that depart from directly pursuing ecient constraint-based convex programming techniques in order to solve them [5, 6, 9, 16, 18] . Researchers have also devised convex proxy alternatives, which have been shown to approximate the intended outcomes of original fairness constraints well [5, 17, 28] . In particular, in this paper, we work with the proxy constraint proposed by Zafar et al. [5] , which constrains disparities in covariance between group membership and the (signed) distance between individuals' feature vectors and the hyperplane decision boundary:
z reects the bias in the demographic makeup of X:z = 1 n P n i=1 z i . Let ( -fair-SVM1-P) be the Soft-Margin SVM program with this covariance constraint. The corresponding Lagrangian is
The (nonnegative) Lagrange multipliers , µ 2 R n correspond to the n nonnegativity constraints i 0 and the margin-slack constraints i ( | x i + b) 1 + i 0 respectively. The multipliers 1 , 2 2 R correspond to the two linearized forms of the absolute value fairness constraint. By complementary slackness, dual variables reveal information about the satisfaction or violation of their corresponding constraints. The analyses in the subsequent two subsections will focus on these interpretations. By the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, at the solution of the convex program, the gradients of L with respect to , b, and i are zero. Plugging in these conditions, the dual Lagrangian is
where = 1 2 . The dual maximizes this objective subject to the
We thus arrive at the Wolfe dual problem
where we have introduced the variable V to eliminate the absolute value function in the objective. Notice that when = 0 and neither of the constraints bind, we recover the standard dual SVM program. Since we are concerned with fair learning that does alter an optimal solution, we consider cases where V is strictly positive. We introduce additional dual variables and + , corresponding to the 2 [ V , V ] constraint and derive the Lagrangian
where u = P n i=1 (z i z)x i geometrically gives some group-sensitive "average" of x 2 X. We can now rewrite ( -fair-SVM1-D) as
, + 0,
where I , P u 2 R d⇥d . The former is the identity matrix, and the latter is the projection matrix onto the vector u. As was also observed by Donini et al., the = 0 version of ( -fair SVM2-D) is equivalent to the standard formulation of the dual SVM program with Kernel
Since we are interested in the welfare impacts of fair learning when fairness constraints do have an impact on optimal solutions, we will assume that the fairness constraint binds. For clarity of exposition, we assume that the positive covariance constraint binds, and thus that = 0 and + = in ( -fair SVM2-D). This is without loss of generalization-the same analyses apply when the negative covariance constraint binds. The dual -fair SVM program becomes minimize µ
We will work from this formulation of the constrained optimization problem for the remainder of the paper.
Impact of Fair Learning on Individuals' Welfares
We now move on to investigate the eects of perturbing a xed -fair SVM by some on the classication outcomes that are issued. We ask, "How are individuals and groups' classications, and thus their welfares, impacted when a learner tightens or loosens a fairness constraint?" The key insight that drives our methods and results is that rather than perform sensitivity analysis directly on the dual variable corresponding to the fairness constraint-which, as we will see in Section 3.4, only gives information about the change in the learner's objective value-we track changes in the classier's behavior by analyzing the eect of perturbations on another set of dual variables: µ i that correspond to the primal margin constraints. Each of these n dual variables indicate whether its corresponding vector x i is correctly classied, lies in the margin, or incorrectly classied. Leveraging how these µ i change as a function fo thereby allows us to track the solution paths of individual points and by extension, compute group welfare paths.
Dene a function p( ) : R ! R that gives the optimal value of the -fair loss minimizing program in ( -fair SVM1-P), which by duality is also the optimal value of ( -fair SVM-D). We begin at a solution p( ) and consider changes in classications at the solution p( + ), where are perturbations can be positive or negative, so long as + > 0. At an optimal solution, the classication fate of each data point x i is encoded in the dual variable µ ⇤ i , which is a function of . µ i ( ) is the -parameterized solution path of µ i such that at any particular solution p( ), the optimal value of the dual variable µ ⇤ i = µ i ( ). As a slight abuse of notation, we reserve notation µ i ( ) for the functional form of the solution path and write µ i ; to refer to the value of the dual variable at a given . Though this lemma seems merely of technical interest, it is a workhorse result for both our methodological contributionsour analytical results and our computationally ecient algorithm, which converts fairness constraints to welfare paths-as well as
Hence, x j are either correctly classied free vectors (7), vectors in the margin (8), or error vectors (9) . We track membership in these sets by letting {F , M, E} be the index set partition at the -fair solution. To analyze the impact that applying a fairness constraint has on individuals' or groups' welfares, we track the behavior of @D @µ j and observe how vector index membership in sets F , M , and E change under a perturbation to . This information will in turn reveal how classications change or remain stable upon tightening or loosening the fairness constraint.
Fairness perturbations do not always shue data points across the dierent membership sets F , M , and E . It is clear that for j 2 {F , E} , so long as a perturbation of does not cause @D @µ j to ip signs or to vanish to 0, j will belong to the same set and
gives the -fair classication outcome for x j . In these cases, an individual's welfare is unaected by the change in the fairness tolerance level from to + . In contrast, vectors x j with j 2 M are subject to a dierent condition to ensure that they stay in the margin: @D @µ j = @D + @µ j = 0, i.e., perturbing by does not lead to any changes in @D @µ j :
for all j 2 M . Let r , j be the change in µ j upon perturbing by , then we have
recalling that µ j is the value of µ j at the optimal solution p( ). Let r , 2 R n+1 be the vector of µ i sensitivities to perturbations with r , 0 as the change in the oset b. For all unshued j 2 M , we can compute r , j by taking the nite dierence of (10) with respect to a perturbation,
It is clear that r , i = 0 for all i that are left unshued in the partition {F , E} . For these "stable ranges" where no i changes its index set membership, we can simplify the previous expression by summing over only those r , i
Thus we can compute r 
where indices are renumbered to only reect i, j 2 M . This matrix is invertible so long as the margin is not empty and the Kernel K (x i , x j ) = h(I P u )x i , (I P u )x j i forms a positive denite matrix. Since the objective function in ( -fair SVM-D) is quadratic, a sucient condition for K to be invertible is that the objective is strictly convex-we assume this as a technical condition. 2 The sensitivities of µ j for j 2 M to perturbations are given by
where v = 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 0 . . . j hu, x j i . . . 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
Plugging this back into (11), we have
Hence, for all j 2 M that stay in the margin, the solution path function µ j ( ) is linear in . For j 2 {F , E} that stay in their partition sets, µ j ( + ) = µ j ( ), so the function is constant.
When perturbations do result in changes in the partition, there are four ways that indices could be shued across sets:
Since index transitions only occur by way of changes to the margin, we need now only conrm that each of these transitions maintains continuous µ j ( ) paths for all j 2 [n] in order to conclude the proof that the paths are piecewise-linear. ⇤
The linearity of paths µ j ( ) for j 2 M gives conditions on the ranges of wherein individuals' classication outcomes do not change. As such, for any given tolerance parameter , we can compute the perturbations that yield no changes to individuals' welfares. The following Proposition gives the analytical form of these stable regions, where although fairness appears to be "improving" or "worsening, " the adjusted learning process has no material eects on the classicatory outcomes that individuals receive. 
with K and v as dened in (12) and (13),
All perturbations of in the range 2
yield no changes to index memberships in the partition {F , M, E} .
We defer the interested reader to the Appendix for the full proof of this Proposition, though we provide a sketch here. The result follows from observing that the sensitivities r i , 0 for i 2 M dened in (13) aect the values @D @µ j for all j 2 [n], and additional conditions must hold to ensure that the vectors that are not on the margin are also unshued by the fairness perturbation. Dene
The condition for stability of vectors x j for j < M is given by
Recall the conditions of membership in sets F and E as given in (7) and (9) respectively. The following observations are critical to computing the bounds of the stable region: For j 2 F , perturbations that increase j do not threaten j's exiting the set; if decreases j , then j can enter M + . Inversely, for j 2 E , perturbations that decrease j ensure that j stays in the same partition, i.e., j 2 E + . Perturbations that increase j can cause j to shue into M + .
For j 2 M to stay in the margin, we need µ + j 2 [0, C]. Once µ j hits either endpoint of the interval, j risks shuing across to
Computing these transition inequalities results in a set of conditions that ensure that a partition is stable. Since can be either positive or negative, we take the maximum of the lower bounds (m j ) and the minimum of the upper bounds (M j ) to arrive at the range of stable perturbations given in (16) . We call the bounds of this interval the "breakpoints" of the solution paths.
This Proposition reveals a mismatch between the ostensible changes to the fairness level of an -fair Soft-Margin SVM learning process and the actual felt changes in outcomes by the individuals who are subject to the system. This results from the simple fact that the optimization problem captures changes in the learner's optimal solution but does not oer such ne-grained information on how individuals' outcomes vary as a result of perturbations. So long as the fairness constraint is binding and its associated dual variable > 0, then tightening or loosening a fairness constraint does alter the loss of the optimal learner classier-the actual SVM solution changes-yet analyzed from the perspective of the individual agents x i , so long as the perturbation occurs within the range given by (16) , classications issued under this + -fair SVM solution are identical to those under the -fair solution. Thus despite the apparent more "fair" signal that a classier abiding by + < sends, agents are made no better o in terms of welfare. This result is summarized in the following Corollary. C 3.4. Let {p( ),W 0 ( ),W 1 ( )} be a triple expressing the welfares of the learner, group z = 0, and group z = 1 under the -fair SVM solution. Then for any 2 (max j m j , 0) where m j is dened in (16) 
Once we have demarcated the limits of perturbations that yield no changes to the partition, i.e., {F , M, E} = {F , M, E} + , we can move on to consider the welfare eects of perturbations that exceed the stable region outlined in Proposition 3.3. At each such breakpoint when reaches max j m j or min j M j as dened in (16) , the margin set changes: M , M + . As such, r + j for j 2 M + must be recomputed via (13) . These sensitivities hold until the next breakpoint when the set M updates again.
We can associate a group welfare with the classication scheme at each of the breakpoints. As already illustrated, index partitions are static in the stable regions around each breakpoint, so group welfares will also be unchanged in these regions. As such, we need only compute welfares at breakpoints to characterize the paths for
. This method of analysis allows practitioners to straightforwardly determine whether the next breakpoint actually translates into better or worse outcomes for the group as a whole.
Of the four possible events that occur at a breakpoint, index transitions between the partitions M and E correspond to changed classications that aect group utilities. The following Proposition characterizes those breakpoint transitions that eect welfares triples {p( ),W 0 ( ),W 1 ( )} for the learner, group z = 0, and group z = 1, that are strictly Pareto dominated by the welfare triple at a neighboring breakpoint. The full proof is left to the Appendix. P 3.5. Consider the welfare triple at the optimal -fair SVM solution given by {p( ),W 0 ( ),W 1 ( )}. Let b L = max j m j < 0 be the neighboring lower breakpoint where index`= arg max j m j ; let b U = min j M j > 0 be the neighboring upper breakpoint where index u = arg min j M j , assuming uniqueness in the arg max and arg min. If`2 E and `= 1, or if`2 M and `= +1, then
Thus minimizing loss in the presence of stricter fairness constraints need not correspond to monotonic gains or losses in the welfare levels of social groups. Fairness perturbations do not have a straightforward eect on classications. Further, these results do not only arise as an unfortunate outcome of using the particular proxy fairness constraint suggested by Zafar et al [5] . So long as the parameter appears in the linear part of the dual Soft-Margin SVM objective function, the µ j ( ) paths exhibit a piecewise linear form characterized by stable regions and breakpoints. Hence, these results apply to many proxy fairness criteria that have so far been proposed in the literature [5, 17, 28] . Even when the dual variable paths are not piecewise linear, so long as they are non-monotonic, fairer classication outcomes do not necessarily confer welfare benets to the disadvantaged group. Monotonicity in welfare space is mathematically distinct from monotonicity in fairness space.
The preceding analyses show that although fairness constraints are often intended to improve classication outcomes for some disadvantaged group, they in general do not abide by the Pareto Principle, a common welfare economic axiom for deciding among social alternatives. That is, asking that an algorithmic procedure abide by a more stringent fairness criteria can lead to enacting classication schemes that actually make every stakeholder group worse-o. Here, the supposed "improved fairness" achieved by decreasing the unfairness tolerance parameter fails to translate into any meaningful improvements in the number of desirable outcomes issued to members of either group. T 3.6. Consider two fairness-constrained ERM programs parameterized by 1 and 2 where 1 < 2 . Then a decision-maker who always prefers the classication outcomes issued under the "more fair" 1 -fair solution to those under the "less fair" 2 -fair solution does not abide by the Pareto Principle.
Algorithm and Complexity
We build upon the previous section of translating fairness constraints into individual welfare outcomes by considering the operationalization of our analysis and its practicality. The algorithmic procedure presented in this section computes breakpoints and tracks the solution paths of the µ j ( ) for all individuals. Hence, the procedure enables the comparison of dierent social groups' welfares-where welfare is determined by the machine's allocative outcome-by aggregating the classication outcomes of all individuals j in a group z. Algorithm 1 outputs two useful fairness-relevant constructs that have as yet not been explored in the literature: 1) solution paths µ j ( ) for j 2 [n] tracking individuals' welfares, and 2) full parameterized curves tracking groups' welfares.
The analysis of the previous section forms the backbone of the main update rules that construct the µ j ( ) paths in Algorithm 1. In particular the values r j , j , and d j as dened in (13), (17), and (18) respectively are key to computing the breakpoints, which in turn fully determine the piecewise linear form of µ j ( ). There is, however, one corner case that the procedure must check that was not discussed in the preceding section. We had previously required that the matrix K be invertible, which is the case whenever our objective function is strictly convex. But if the margin is empty, the standard update procedure, which computes sensitivities r j and K , will not suce. The KKT optimality condition P n i=1 µ i i = 0 requires that the multiple indices moving in the margin at once must be positive and negative examples. For this reason we must refer to a dierent procedure to compute the breakpoint at which this transition occurs. For continuity of the main text of this paper, the full exposition of this analysis is given in the Appendix.
The following complexity result highlights the practicality of implementing the fairness-to-welfare mapping in Algorithm 1 to track the full solution paths of an -fair SVM program. We note that standard SVM algorithms such as LibSVM run in O (n 3 ), and thus once the algorithm has been initialized with the unconstrained SVM solution, the complexity of computing both the full individual solution paths µ j ( ) and the full group welfare curves {W 0 ( ),W 1 ( )} is on the same order as that of computing a single SVM solution.
T 3.7. Each iteration of Algorithm 1 runs in O (n 2 + |M| 2 ). For breakpoints on the order of n, the full run time complexity is
P. Each iteration of the fairness-to-welfare algorithm requires the inversion of matrix K 2 R |M |+1 and the computations of r j 2 R |M | for j 2 M , and j and d j for j 2 {F , E} .
The standard Gauss-Jordan matrix inversion technique runs in O (|M| 3 ), but we take advantage of partition update rules to lower the number of computations: Since at each new breakpoint, the Input: set X of n data points {x i , z i , i } Output: solutions paths µ ( ) and group welfare curves {W 0 ( ),
for each µ i do update {F , M, E } according to (7), (8), (9); (26); update {F , M, E } according to (28) and (29); = + ; end compute r , d according to (13) , (18); = min i M i as given in (16);
partition tends to change because of additions or eliminations of a single index j from the set M, we can use the Cholesky decomposition rank-one update or downdate to ease the need to recompute the full matrix inverse at every iteration, thereby reducing the complexity of the operation to O (|M| 2 ). Computing the stability region conditions for j 2 {F , E} requires O ⇣ (n |M|)|M | ⌘ steps. As such, at each breakpoint, the total computational cost is O (|M| 2 + n 2 ).
The number of breakpoints for each full run of the algorithm depends on the data distribution and how sensitive the solution is to the constraint. As a heuristic, datasets whose fairness constraints bind for smaller have fewer breakpoints. Previous empirical results on the full SVM path for L1 and L2 regularization have found that the number of breakpoints tends to be on the order of n [24] [25] [26] [27] . Thus after initialization with 0-fair SVM solution, the nal complexity for the algorithm is O (n 3 + n|M| 2 ). ⇤
Impact of Fair Learning on Learner's Welfare
Having proven the main welfare-relevant sensitivity result for groups, we return to more standard analysis of the eect of perturbations on the learner's loss. In this case, we directly solve for the dual variable of the fairness constraint. Recall ⇤ from (23):
By complementary slackness, one of and + is zero, and the other is . In particular, if = 0, then + = , then we know that > 0. Thus the original fairness constraint that binds is the upper bound on covariance, suggesting that the optimal classier must be constrained to limit its positive covariance with group z = 1. If + = 0, then = and < 0, and the classier must be constrained to limit its positive covariance with group z = 0.
We can interpret the value of the dual variable Lagrange multiplier as the shadow price of the fairness constraint. It gives the additional loss in the objective value that the learner would achieve if the fairness constraint were innitesimally loosened. Whenever a fairness constraint binds, its shadow price is readily computable and is given by ⇤ . It bears noting that because ( -fair Soft-SVM) is not a linear program, ⇤ can only be interpreted as a measure of local sensitivity, valid only in a small neighborhood around an optimal solution. But through an alternative lens of sensitivity analysis, we can derive a lower bound on global sensitivity due to changes in the fairness tolerance parameter . By writing as a perturbation variable, we can perform sensitivity analysis on the same -constrained problem. Returning to the perturbation function p( ), we have
where L(µ ⇤ , ⇤ ) gives the solution to the 0-fair SVM problem.
The perturbation formulation given in (21) is identical in form to the original program ( -fair-SVM1-P) but gives a global bound on
Since (21) gives a lower bound, the global sensitivity bound yields an asymmetric interpretation.
, and is thus also small in magnitude.
Proposition 3.8 shows that tightening the fairness constraint when its shadow price is high leads to a great increase in learner loss, but loosening the fairness constraint when its shadow price is small leads only to a small decrease in loss.
EXPERIMENTS
To demonstrate the ecacy of our approach, we track the impact of -fairness constrained SVM programs on the classication outcomes of individuals in the Adult dataset. The target variable in the dataset is a binary value indicating whether the individual has an annual income of more or less than $50,000. If such a dataset were used to train a tool to be deployed in consequential resource allocation-say, for the purpose of determining access to creditthen classication decisions directly impact individuals' welfares.
Individual solution paths and relative group welfare changes are given in Figure 1 . As increases from left to right, the fairness constraint is loosened, and outcomes become "less fair." In the case of the -fair SVM solution to the Adult dataset, the fairness constraint ceases to bind at the optimal solution when ⇡ 0.175. The top panel shows example individual piecewise linear paths of dual variables µ i ( ), providing a visual depiction of how individual points can transition across index sets: from µ i = 0, i 2 F and being correctly labeled, to µ i 2 (0, 1), i 2 M, being correctly labeled but in margin; to µ i = 1, i 2 E and being incorrectly labeled. Solid paths indicate individuals coded female; dashed paths indicate those coded males. As the top panel of Figure 1 shows, the actual "journey" of these paths are varied as changes.
As expected, tightening the fairness constraint in the -fair program does tend to lead to improved welfare outcomes for females as a group (more female individuals receive a positive classication), while males experience a relative decline in group welfare (receiving fewer positive classications). However, as suggested by our results in Section 3.2, these welfare changes are not monotonic for either group. Tightening the fairness constraint could lead to declines in both groups' welfares, demonstrating that preferring more fair solutions in this predictive model does not abide by the Pareto Principle. We highlight an instance of this result in the bottom panel of Figure 1 , where orange dashed lines to the left of black ones mark o solutions where "more fair" outcomes (orange) are Pareto-dominated by "less fair" (black) ones. A practitioner working in a domain in which welfare considerations might override paritybased fairness ones may prefer the outcomes of a fair learning procedure with ⇡ 0.045 to one with ⇡ 0.015. Additional plots showing absolute changes in group welfare and optimal learner value are given in the Appendix.
DISCUSSION
The question that leads o this paper-How do leading notions of fairness as dened by computer scientists map onto longer-standing notions of social welfare?-sets an important agenda to come for the eld of algorithmic fairness. It asks that the community look to disciplines that have long considered the problem of allocating goods in accordance with ideals of justice and fairness. For example, the notion of welfare in this paper draws from work in welfare and public economics. The outcomes issued by an optimal classier can, thus, be interpreted using welfare economic tools developed for considerations of social eciency and equity. In an eort to situate computer scientists' notions of fairness within a broader understanding of distributive justice, we also show that loss minimization problems can indeed be mapped onto welfare maximization ones and vice versa. For reasons of continuity, analyses of this correspondence do not appear in the main text-we defer the interested reader to the Appendix-though we present an abbreviated overview here. We encourage readers to consider the main results of this paper, which construct welfare paths out of fair learning algorithms, as a part of this larger project of bridging the two approaches.
Bridging Fair Machine Learning and Social Welfare Maximization
To highlight the correspondence between the machine learning and welfare economic approaches to allocation, we show that loss minimizing solutions can be understood as welfare maximizing ones under a particular social welfare function. In the Planner's Problem, a planner maximizes social welfare represented as the weighted sum of utility functions. Inverting the Planner's Problem gives a question concerning social equity: "Given a particular allocation, what is the presumptive social weight function that would yield it as optimal?" We show that the set of predictions issued by the optimal classier of any loss minimization task can be given as the set of allocations in the Planner's Problem over the same individuals endowed with a set of welfare weights. Analyzing the distribution of implied weights of individuals and groups oers a welfare economic way of considering the "fairness" of classications. We also derive a converse result: "Given a social welfare maximizing allocation, what model that can achieve an equivalent classication?" Our solution's approach records the set of welfares, dened by the number of positively labeled individuals, achievable for each social group.
Interpreting Welfare Alongside Fairness
Welfare economics can lend particular insights into formalizing notions of distributional fairness and general insights into building a "technical" eld and methodology that grapples with normative questions. The eld is concerned with what public policies ought to be, how to improve individuals' well-beings, and what distribution of outcomes are preferable. Answers to these questions appeal to values and judgments that refer to more than just descriptive or predictive facts about the world. The success of fair machine will largely hang on how well it can adapt to a similar ambitious task. However, welfare economics is not the only-nor should it even serve as the main-academic resource for thinking through how goods ought to be provisioned in a just society. In this moment of broad appeal to the prowess of algorithmic systems, researchers in computing are called on to advise on matters beyond their specialized expertise and training. Many of these matters require explicit normative, political, and social-scientic reasoning. Insights and methods from across the arts, humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences bear fruit in answering these questions. This paper does not look to contribute a new fair learning algorithm or a new fairness denition. We take a popular classication algorithm, the Soft Margin SVM, append a parity-based fairness constraint, and analyze its implications on welfare. The constraint that we center in the paper is just one concretization of a large menu of fairness notions that have been oered up to now. The method of analysis developed in the paper applies generally to any convex formulations of these constraints, including versions of balance for false positives, balance for false negatives, and equality of opportunity that have circulated in the literature [17, 18, 28] . It is important future work to investigate the welfare implications of state-of-the-art fair classication algorithms that the community continues to develop, which can deal with a wider range of models and constraints, including non-convex ones.
This paper asks that researchers in fair machine learning reevaluate not only their lodestars of optimality and eciency but also their latest metrics of fairness. By viewing classication outcomes as allocations of a good, we incorporate considerations of individual and group utility in our analysis of classication regimes. The concept of "utility" in evaluations of social policy remains controversial, but in many cases of social distribution, utility considerations provide a partial but still important perspective on what is at stake within an allocative task. Utility-based notions of welfare can capture the relative benet that a particular good can have on a particular individual. If machine learning systems are in eect serving as resource distribution mechanisms, then questions about fairness should align with questions of "Who benets?" Our results show that many parity-based formulations of fairness do not ensure that disadvantaged groups benet. Preferring a classier that better accords with a fairness measure can lead to selecting allocations that lower the welfare for every group. Nevertheless, there remain reasons in favor of limiting levels of inequality not reected in utilitarian calculus. In some cases, the gap between groups is itself objectionable, and minimizing this dierence overrides maximizing the absolute utility level of disadvantaged groups. But without acknowledging and accounting for these reasons, well-intentioned optimization tasks that seek to be "fairer" can further disadvantage social groups for no reason but to satisfy a given fairness metric.
